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ABSTRACT 
Reconstruction and development in poor, fragile countries present a double challenge: tackling the issues of 
poverty and underdevelopment as well as the constraints posed by instability, poor governance, and weak 
capacity. This context generates a range of problems that include: insecurity, insufficient planning, inadequate 
implementation capacity, poor financial management, misprocurement, corruption, a volatile fiscal environment, 
ineffective donor coordination, and negative environmental and social impacts. The paper draws lessons from 
positive and negative experiences in meeting these challenges in three conflict- and/or disaster-affected cases: 
Aceh Province, Indonesia (postdisaster reconstruction and postconflict development following the tsunami and 
earthquakes of 2004), Haiti (postdisaster recovery following the earthquake of 2010), and South Sudan 
(postconflict development following independence in 2011). These lessons are then organized in an assessment 
framework of risks and mitigation measures to assist academics and practitioners to understand and address the 
challenges of reconstruction and development in fragile states. 
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1. WHAT IS THE CHALLENGE OF 
RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT IN 
FRAGILE STATES? 
This paper is an effort to guide practitioners and 
theoreticians to understand and address the 
challenge of reconstruction and development in 
fragile states. The first section provides a brief 
review of the literature on fragile and conflict-
affected states in the developing world. The 
following section draws on the author’s experiences 
with reconstruction and/or development in three 
fragile contexts: the province of Aceh in Indonesia, 
Haiti, and South Sudan. The final section presents a 
risk assessment and mitigation framework that 
draws lessons from both the literature and individual 
experience as a useful instrument to promote 
recovery, growth, and poverty reduction in situations 
of fragility and conflict. 
A first step is to define what we mean by fragility. 
While there is no standard definition of fragility, the 
most commonly referenced meaning is provided by 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD): “a state with weak capacity 
to carry out the basic state functions of governing a 
population and its territory and that lacks the ability 
or political will to develop mutually constructive and 
reinforcing relations with society” (OECD, 2007). 
Fragility is, in fact, a continuum with violent conflict 
and/or complete state failure on one end and 
varying degrees of poor governance and/or violence 
at different points along the continuum 
(Agborsangaya-Fiteu & Wam, 2009).  
When applying this definition, at least a quarter of 
the world’s people live in fragile and conflict-affected 
situations (Asian Development Bank [ADB], 2012; 
World Bank, 2013c). As these can occur both at the 
level of the state as well as the subnational level, 
the ADB has characterized four types of situations: 
fragility, conflict, transitional status, and subnational 
fragility and/or conflict (ibid). The annex to this 
paper provides a current listing of states with such 
situations. All but three of these states are amongst 
the most poverty-stricken (per capita incomes below 
$1,205 per year), thus making them eligible for 
concessional financing from the International 
Development Association and other development 
agencies. 
Recent research has focused on the linkages 
between poverty and fragility (Collier, 2007) as well 
as violence (World Bank, 2011). Seventy percent of 
fragile states have experienced some form of 
violent conflict since 1989 while poverty rates in 
these states average 54% as compared with 22% 
for all low-income countries (World Bank, 2013c). 
Fragile states have not benefited from the global 
decline in poverty, and the share of the world’s poor 
living in fragile states has increased (Kharas & 
Rogerson, 2012).  
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Beyond these sad numerical relationships, what 
else do we know about the dynamics of fragility and 
development? The UK Department of International 
Development recently conducted a review of 
research on governance and fragile states 
undertaken during the first decade of this century. 
The synthesis notes that the inability to prevent 
conflict or provide basic services takes a human toll, 
prevents generations of households from escaping 
poverty, and traps countries in a cycle of aid 
dependency. It draws four main conclusions: (1) 
stakeholder participation helps to both improve 
service provision and build more effective, 
accountable governments; (2) security is a 
precondition for development; (3) conflict is more 
likely in situations where there are high levels of 
inequity between different religious and ethnic 
groups; and (4) effective taxation policies are critical 
to build viable states that can move beyond aid 
dependence (DFID Research and Evidence 
Division, 2010). 
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Source: OECD, 2008, p. 2 
The OECD’s Development Assistance Committee 
has translated this and other findings into a 
framework for responding to situations of fragility 
and conflict along four dimensions: socioeconomic 
development; good governance; reform of justice 
and security institutions; and a culture of truth, 
justice, and reconciliation. These are presented in 
Table 1. 
2. LESSONS FROM THREE EXAMPLES 
This section draws on the author’s professional 
experience working in three fragile contexts: Aceh 
Province (Indonesia) from 2004–2009, Haiti from 
2010–2014, and South Sudan from 2013–2014. 
Aceh represents a hybrid case of reconstruction 
following natural disasters and postconflict 
development. Haiti focuses on postdisaster 
recovery within a fragile state. South Sudan 
portrays the development challenges in a 
postconflict setting. Relevant lessons are drawn 
from each case to inform the following section on 
risk management. A caveat—these lessons are not 
comprehensive or universal but rather drawn from 
the author’s specific experiences stemming from 
designing and/or managing multidonor funds in 
each setting. 
2.1. Aceh Province 
The Indonesian province of Aceh was hit by a 
massive earthquake (9.1 Richter scale) on 
December 26, 2004, which unleashed a series of 
tsunamis that destroyed much of the province and 
had an impact throughout the Indian Ocean. An 
estimated 230,000 people in 14 countries were 
killed, millions were left homeless, and billions of 
dollars in damages and losses were incurred. 
Aceh suffered the brunt of this impact. There were 
more than 120,000 fatalities, another 90,000 people 
were missing, and nearly 500,000 survivors lost 
their homes out of a provincial population of 4.25 
million. The already fragile local government lost 
3,000 civil servants, 2,275 were reported missing, 
669 government buildings were destroyed, records 
and databases were lost, and equipment was 
destroyed (Government of Indonesia, 2005b). 
Economic damages and losses amounted to US $5 
billion, equivalent to 109% of provincial GDP 
(Government of Indonesia, 2005a). 
At the time of the disaster, Aceh was at the tail end 
of a 30-year conflict between separatist rebels and 
the central government that had claimed up to 
25,000 lives, displaced over 400,000 people, 
destroyed much of the productive sector, 
undermined the delivery of basic services in many 
areas, weakened institutions, eroded the social 
fabric, traumatized a large portion of Acehnese 
society, and created deep political fault lines 
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between Aceh and Jakarta (Government of 
Indonesia et al., 2009). Aceh had been under 18 
months of martial law and civil emergency following 
the collapse of peace negotiations between the 
central government and the Free Aceh Movement. 
The province was effectively closed to most 
international aid agencies, with only the 
International Committee of the Red Cross, the UN 
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 
and a small number of locally staffed NGOs 
maintaining activities (Tsunami Evaluation Coalition 
[TEC], 2007).  
The author arrived in Indonesia about three months 
before the earthquake and tsunami to serve as the 
World Bank’s environment coordinator. I was 
immediately tasked with calculating the 
environmental damages and losses from the natural 
disasters during the first two weeks of 2005. I was 
then asked to outline the design of a multidonor 
fund to help finance the reconstruction and ended 
up managing the $650 million Multi-Donor Fund for 
Aceh and Nias for its critical first 18 months of 
operation. 
I personally learned a series of lessons related to: 
(1) addressing the financing gap between 
reconstruction needs and immediately available 
finance; (2) filling the gap between what is known 
locally and internationally about reconstruction; (3) 
accelerating the pace of recovery through 
coordination, cooperation, and removal of barriers; 
(4) strengthening institutions so that they are more 
capable of managing the recovery; and (5) 
improving governance by giving voice to 
stakeholders in both recovery planning and 
implementation (Leitmann, forthcoming). This final 
section of the chapter characterizes each type of 
value added and draws lessons for managing 
partnerships. 
2.1.1. Addressing the Financing Gap 
One notable difference between recovery in low-
income countries and developed economies is the 
lack of formal insurance coverage by households 
and businesses. For example, about half of losses 
resulting from Hurricane Andrew in Florida and the 
Northridge earthquake in California were covered 
by formal insurance, while less than 15% of losses 
resulting from the Indian Ocean tsunami were 
covered (Woodruff, de Mel, & McKenzie, 2010). In 
the public sector in developing countries, very little 
money is usually set aside in anticipation of 
disasters but, for major events, there is often a 
massive inflow of assistance from the international 
community. Often, though, the supply of external 
financing does not match recovery needs and, thus, 
there are sectoral and geographical financing gaps. 
 
• Lessons 
o Reconstruction can be delayed if 
adequate financing is not available: 
This can be overcome by: (a) 
reconfiguring existing projects and 
programs in the disaster-affected 
area; (b) drawing on government 
sources of standby financing; and 
(c) mobilizing external assistance 
from donors and NGOs that can 
flow outside of the government 
budget to support government 
policies and programs. 
2.1.2. Filling the Knowledge Gap 
When reality gets turned on its head after a disaster 
or following a conflict, good information is at a 
premium—it is needed urgently and it is hard to 
obtain. Partnerships can help fill the knowledge gap 
right from the outset with the preparation of a 
Postdisaster (or Postconflict) Needs Assessment, 
which now combines the ECLAC-style damage and 
loss economic analysis with a more survey-based 
approach to basic needs. During the reconstruction, 
financial tracking combined with monitoring of a 
results framework and/or reconstruction standards 
can be used to gauge the ongoing performance 
(efficiency and efficacy) of reconstruction activities 
and the recovery program as a whole. Finally, 
important knowledge can be generated for the 
future by conducting a postreconstruction 
evaluation to both assess final performance and 
learn lessons for reducing the risk and responding 
to future disasters. 
• Lessons 
o Build communities: The initial rush 
to provide shelter can result in 
rebuilding structures not 
communities. In addition to 
structures, attention must be paid to 
local infrastructure (water, 
sanitation, transport, electricity, 
waste management), livelihoods, 
and social and religious facilities. 
o Pick the right partners: Partners 
should be chosen based on their 
proven ability to deliver good 
practices. Conversely, 
inexperienced but perhaps well-
financed partners can actually 
reduce the quality and pace of 
recovery. 
2.1.3. Accelerating the Speed of Recovery 
The pace of reconstruction can be hindered or 
hampered depending on how well partnerships are 
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managed. For example, the lack of local-national 
coordination in the initial post-Hurricane Katrina 
response was later reflected in various aspects of the 
recovery phase and contributed to making rapid 
reconstruction problematic. On the other hand, 
countries that have established effective coordination 
mechanisms for local, national and even international 
coordination have fared better in implementing a 
swifter recovery, e.g. the role played by the Recovery 
Agency (BRR) in Aceh. 
• Lessons 
o Coordinate partnerships: A multitude 
of well-meaning partners may want 
to contribute to the recovery process 
but, if uncoordinated, they can work 
at cross-purposes. These potential 
roadblocks to speedy recovery can 
be overcome by formal and informal 
coordination mechanisms.  
o Incorporate disaster risk reduction: 
Resilience to the next disaster can 
be increased at a relatively low cost 
by building disaster risk reduction 
into the recovery process, including 
greater public awareness, early 
warning systems, more resilient 
infrastructure, more responsive 
services, better siting of facilities, 
and institutional coordination for 
disaster response. 
2.1.4. Strengthening Institutions for Recovery 
Management 
Local institutions often suffer from severely reduced 
capacity following disasters, often losing staff, 
buildings, equipment, and records as happened in 
Aceh. National institutions can be similarly affected 
from catastrophes, as was the case following the 
January 2010 earthquake in Haiti. In order to ensure 
the long-term sustainability of recovery and ensuing 
development, partnerships must incorporate a focus 
on strengthening institutional capacity. 
• Lessons 
o Involve local authorities: Local 
governments, along with 
communities and NGOs, are often 
the first-responders following a 
disaster and they are accountable 
for eventual management of the 
reconstruction process. Strong local 
governments should be 
acknowledged leaders in the 
recovery while weaker local 
governments may require significant 
capacity building. When 
reconstruction is “handed over” from 
stronger partners to local 
government, the local authority must 
be prepared to receive, manage and 
maintain assets that are being 
transferred. 
2.2. Haiti 
Haiti was struck by a 7.0 magnitude earthquake on 
January 12, 2010, with its epicenter only 25 west of 
the capital, Port-au-Prince. The government 
estimated that 316,000 people were killed, more than 
300,500 people were injured and up to 1.5 million left 
homeless (2010 Haiti earthquake, n.d.), making it the 
largest urban disaster in recent world history.  
Prior to the disaster, Haiti was already the poorest 
country in the Western hemisphere with a fragile, 
with a history of fragile, often unstable governance. 
The earthquake damaged or destroyed 60% of the 
country’s administrative and economic infrastructure, 
20% of its schools and 50% of its hospitals (2010 
Haiti earthquake, n.d.; Office of the Special Envoy for 
Haiti, 2012). The official post-disaster needs 
assessment estimated the value of damage and 
losses at $7.8 billion, slightly higher than the 
country’s gross domestic product (GDP) in 2009 
(Government of Haiti, 2010). Seventy per cent of 
these losses were suffered by the private sector, with 
housing being the most severely affected sector. 
Days after the earthquake, the author was asked to 
advise the Latin America/Caribbean team at the 
World Bank on options for establishing a multi-donor 
fund for recovery, based in part on the Aceh 
experience. After two months of discussion and 
planning, the World Bank was asked to establish the 
Haiti Reconstruction Fund (HRF) and I became its 
manager in May 2010. The HRF has now raised 
almost $400 million of which three-quarters has been 
used to finance twenty strategic reconstruction 
projects (HRF, 2013). The following lessons are 
drawn from that experience. 
2.2.1. Designing Development Finance 
Prior to the earthquake, Haiti was emerging from a 
long history of poverty, inadequate governance, 
uneven foreign assistance, corruption, and instability. 
The disaster exacerbated all of these factors. These 
challenges had to be taken into consideration when 
the HRF was designed so that it could operate 
effectively in a very difficult post-disaster 
environment.  
• Lessons. 
o Table 2 summarizes the key issues 
that were faced, the needs that 
arose from the challenges and the 
lessons that were applied in the 
design of the HRF. 
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Table 2. Design factors that enable the HRF to operate 
effectively in Haiti 
Issue Need Design Lessons 
Damage from 
earthquake affected 
every sector of 
society and 
economy 
Ability to respond to a 
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that have a broad 
set of comparative 
advantages (IDB, 




weakened at all 
levels 
Build capacity and 
authority by putting 







and sets the 
priorities for 
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History of corruption 
and inefficiency 
Need for transparent 
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Minimize risks by 
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Enhance quality by 
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international 
standards, for each 
activity 
Many reconstruction 
needs are urgent 
Ability to make 











hampered by many 
factors 
Need to work with 
entities that have a 








NGOs, UN, private 
sector, etc.) 
Source: HRF, 2011 
2.2.2. Implementing Development Finance 
The HRF was designed in early 2010 using the 
lessons and design elements listed in Table 2. It 
then became operational in mid-2010 after the first 
contributions were received and the government, 
along with the international community, had 
established a reconstruction coordination body 
known as the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission 
(IHRC). The IHRC was the HRF’s counterpart for its 
first 18 months until the Commission’s mandate 
expired. The counterpart role then took on a more 
conventional tone in the form of the Ministry of 
Planning and External Cooperation, an 
arrangement that continues to the present day. 
Lessons 
• Thus, the HRF has nearly four years of 
operational experience during which the 
following lessons were learned about 
implementing development finance in a 
fragile, postdisaster context:  
o Streamlined procedures facilitate a 
rapid response: Because the HRF has 
efficient procedures, tight performance 
standards, good lines of 
communication, and a decision-making 
process that is coordinated with the 
government, it can respond quickly to 
new policy initiatives and requests for 
financing. This was evidenced in July 
and August 2011 when the HRF 
received, reviewed, allocated, and 
transferred US $30 million in a month to 
kick-start President Martelly’s flagship 
“16/6” camp resettlement program. 
o Working through Partner Entities 
ensures that funds are effectively spent: 
The HRF’s Partner Entities apply 
international standards of good practice 
in financial management, procurement, 
environmental and social safeguards, 
project design, and monitoring and 
evaluation for the use of HRF financing. 
o An efficient structure minimizes 
administrative costs: The HRF has one 
of the lowest expense ratios (under 5%) 
of any postdisaster multidonor trust 
fund. This can be attributed to well-
established Partner Entities, a modestly 
sized Secretariat, an efficient Trustee, 
and a clear division of labor between 
them. 
o Government leadership poses 
tradeoffs: the HRF has clearly benefited 
from the Government of Haiti’s 
leadership in chairing its Steering 
Committee and setting priorities for 
financing. The downside is that 
government instability resulted in a 
slower pace of allocation as priority 
setting and replacement of the IHRC as 
the HRF’s counterpart have proven to 
be challenging for the GoH when 
legitimacy is in doubt. 
o An independent governance structure is 
invaluable: The HRF was able to 
continue operations during a period of 
political instability in Haiti in part 
because it has a governance structure 
that is independent. Thus, while the 
IHRC stopped functioning after the 
expiration of its mandate, the HRF 
Steering Committee, Secretariat, 
Trustee, and Partner Entities continued 
to operate. 
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o A return to “normal” arrangements was 
warranted: The lengthy process of 
agreeing on a new counterpart and 
procedures resulted in a system that 
relies on normal government 
procedures and institutions. While more 
time consuming than the initial 
arrangements with the IHRC, this 
should strengthen GoH capacity as well 
as the legitimacy and ownership of 
financing requests to the HRF.  
o Donor preferencing poses tradeoffs: On 
the positive side, the expression of 
preferences by some donors about the 
use of their contributions increased the 
total amount of funding available to the 
HRF. On the downside, reserving funds 
in order to guarantee that preferences 
are met has reduced the flexibility and 
availability of HRF financing and is at 
odds with the goal of enhancing 
government ownership as well as 
alignment with government priorities. 
(HRF, 2012; 2013) 
2.3. South Sudan 
South Sudan is the world’s newest country, 
achieving independence from Sudan in 2011. The 
signature of a comprehensive peace agreement 
(CPA) in 2005 ended five decades of war which cost 
over two million lives. Since then, South Sudan has 
experienced relative peace, though it remains 
deeply fragile. Exacerbated by its historical and 
geographical isolation, the period of heightened 
tensions between South Sudan and Sudan, and 
internal episodic violence, the legacy of economic 
underdevelopment, and institutional deficits 
contribute to the fragility of the country. The 
governance structures are largely concentrated in 
former garrison towns such as the capital of Juba in 
a landlocked area about the size of Afghanistan with 
a population of 11.8 million people (Knopf, 2013). In 
mid-December 2013, tribal violence erupted once 
again. 
Despite South Sudan’s great resource wealth, its 
population is one of the most deprived, with 
extremely poor social indicators and dramatic 
gender disparities. Outside a few oil enclaves and 
underutilized fertile soils, South Sudan remains a 
relatively undeveloped subsistence economy. Oil 
revenues are also associated with poor governance 
and corruption, which have started to color the 
population’s perceptions of their state and threaten 
to undermine its legitimacy. The most significant 
stress factors include: possible future tensions with 
Sudan; internal conflicts resulting from contestation 
among different social and economic groups over 
access to power, resources, and services; 
ineffective governance, corrupt public financial 
management, continued draining of oil revenues 
without capital investment or improved welfare; 
underdevelopment of the nonoil economy; and 
extreme economic deprivation of the population 
(World Bank, 2013b). 
In mid-2013, the author was asked to advise the 
Africa region of the World Bank with options for 
creating a partnership fund to help finance 
development and capacity-building initiatives in 
South Sudan. In September 2013, the GRSS asked 
the World Bank to design a South Sudan 
Partnership Fund (SSPF), and I was named to head 
the design team. Work on the design process, along 
with most development assistance, came to a halt 
in mid-December 2013 with the outbreak of ethnic 
conflict in various parts of the country that has 
continued through the first quarter of 2014. 
2.3.1. Designing Development Finance in a Fragile, 
Postconflict State 
The SSPF is building on the experience gained 
during World Bank management of the Multi-Donor 
Trust Fund for South Sudan (MDTF-SS) from 2005–
2012. While there were important accomplishments 
during this period, the international community 
overestimated government capacity and had an 
uneven record in building the capability of the 
GRSS. Instead, the providers of financial assistance 
relied heavily on NGOs for service delivery. Thus, 
despite the US $4.2 billion spent during the CPA 
period, the assistance did not have the expected 
impact on what should have been its priority—
mitigating the sources of conflict in South Sudan 
and building systems to ensure that oil revenues 
would be used to improve the population’s 
economic and social welfare.  
Lessons: 
• An evaluation of the South Sudan Multi-
Donor Trust Fund (Fafo Institute for Applied 
International Studies, 2013) drew the 
following lessons that were the most 
relevant to the establishment of the SSPF: 
o The fund’s governance body must 
manage the interaction between 
political aspirations and expectations 
and fund operations 
o The World Bank has an important 
responsibility to assess technical 
feasibility against the fund’s contextual 
and political reality 
o The recipient execution modality 
depends on government leadership and 
capacity 
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o The key performance variable is 
government leadership, with donors 
and the fund aligned behind the 
government’s agenda 
o The highest level of the fund’s 
governance system should minimize its 
involvement in operational details 
o Successful projects have strong 
national leadership; are well prepared; 
have a simple design and realistic 
development objectives, scope and 
implementation schedules; and do not 
exceed the capacity of national 
implementing institutions 
o A limited number of activities can be 
done “quick and well” while other 
projects can only be done “well” with 
time 
o Procurement policies need to be more 
flexible in response to institutional 
capacity constraints, local market 
conditions, and other risks 
In addition to these South Sudan-specific lessons, 
the World Bank has learned from its extensive 
global experience about how to improve the design 
and operation of partnership funds, especially in 
fragile and conflict-affected states (Leitmann, 2013). 
Some of these lessons that are applicable to the 
SSPF include: (a) design for simplicity with 
expectations that are realistic for the context; (b) 
clarify the role of each stakeholder at the outset; (c) 
engage other development partners such as the UN 
and NGOs; (d) draw on and scale up existing 
effective operations; (e) prepare for higher 
preparation and operating costs in fragile states; (f) 
do things in parallel to save time and resources; 
and (g) develop a strong communications strategy 
The proposed design for the SSPF embodies these 
lessons by: 
• Acknowledging government leadership of 
the Fund (governing body, secretariat, 
preparation of activities) while providing 
significant support for capacity building 
• Supporting a straightforward development 
objective and limited set of priority sectors 
• Allowing for flexibility through the 
application of the World Bank’s policies for 
fragile and conflict-affected states 
• Using a streamlined grant-approval process 
with clear and measurable performance 
standards 
• Establishing a division of labor between the 
governing body, the SSPF’s administrator, 
the Secretariat, government authorities, and 
implementing agencies 
• Seeking to use the comparative advantages 
of a range of implementing agencies 
• Anticipating the need to support the costs of 
preparing activities and integrating 
maintenance issues in the design of 
activities.  
3. RISK MANAGEMENT FOR FRAGILE AND 
CONFLICT-AFFECTED SITUATIONS 
3.1. Risk Management Framework 
Risk assessments are a key input to the World 
Bank’s decision whether or not to go forward with 
the preparation of a new investment project 
financing operation, helping to determine and 
maintain an adequate balance between the 
expected results of an operation and its risks. At the 
project level, these assessments are a key tool to 
(1) identify risks that can be mitigated adjusting the 
project’s scope/design to improve the likelihood of 
achieving the expected results; (2) define an action 
plan to manage the risks, establishing specific risk 
mitigation measures as well as capacity-building 
activities to address those risks; and (3) determine 
the level of Bank implementation support for the 
project based on its risk profile. In addition, the risk-
based approach is designed to assist in deciding on 
the processing speed based on risk and in 
allocating resources to the areas that are burdened 
with the greatest risk. 
A central tool of the risk-based approach is the 
Operational Risk Assessment Framework (ORAF). 
The ORAF helps managers and all members of 
project and country teams look in a systematic, 
holistic, and integrated manner and in real-time at 
risks to achieving project development objectives 
(PDOs). Teams are expected to use the framework 
to achieve the following: 
• Identify and describe the most relevant risks 
to the project, rate those risks based on 
their relevance, and establish management 
measures when required; 
• Track progress regarding the 
implementation and effectiveness of risk 
mitigation/risk management measures; 
• Update the ORAF over the life of the 
project; and 
• Adjust project design as necessary to 
support the achievement of the project 
development objectives. 
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The ORAF is an integrated and nested risk 
framework that pulls together key risk areas that 
may affect the achievement of the PDO of an 
operation. Four different levels of risks, broken 
down into 10 risk areas, are considered under the 
ORAF: 
• Stakeholder-level risks: Project teams 
assess risks to the Bank’s relations with 
borrowers, donors, and other key 
stakeholders, who might question or even 
oppose the project in a manner that could 
affect the achievement of its development 
objectives. Project teams need to be aware 
and mitigate where possible. 
• Operating environment-level risks: This 
level includes country risk and 
sector/multisector risk. These risks are 
related to the environment in which the 
project operates and not to the PDO. 
Project teams need to be aware of these 
risks even though they cannot generally be 
mitigated by the project. Teams are 
expected to take into account the impact of 
those operating environment risks on the 
development objectives of the specific 
project, in the relevant risk section (for 
example, the implementing agency-level or 
project-level risk). 
• Implementing agency-level risks: This level 
includes capacity risk and governance risk 
(which includes a fraud and corruption risk 
sucategory). These risks are related to the 
specific agencies that implement the 
project. There is scope to influence the risk 
level over the course of the project through 
mitigation measures and project design. 
Given the sensitivity of rating fraud and 
corruption, fraud and corruption risks are 
treated differently in terms of public 
disclosure. 
• Project-level risks: This level includes 
design risk, social and environmental risk, 
program and donor risk, and delivery 
monitoring and sustainability risk. 
Project teams also have the option to identify one or 
two additional risks (other risks) that may be 
specific to the operation if they are not captured in 
the existing list. This framework is presented 
graphically in Figure 1. 
A separate and ongoing risk assessment is 
conducted for project-level financial management 
which occurs during project design and 
implementation as part of supervision work. This 
assessment looks at both inherent risks (the 
country’s public financial management system and 
the systems of the implementing agency) and 
control risks (project design, budgeting process, 
accounting, internal controls, fund flow, financial 
reporting, auditing). At the design phase, measures 
are integrated to address detected risks. During 
implementation, financial management risks are 
monitored and addressed during project supervision 
(World Bank, 2010; 2011a). 
 
Figure 1. Operational risk assessment framework. Source: World 
Bank, 2010, p. 2 
3.2. Realigning the Framework for Fragile and 
Conflict-Affected Situations 
The framework presented in Figure 1 is generic and 
needs to be modified for each national or 
subnational context. The following areas may 
require more attention and emphasis in fragile and 
conflict-affected situations: 
• Stakeholder risk: Relations with key 
government counterparts may need more 
intensive analysis as many FCAS situations 
are characterized by frequent changes in 
key officials or even entire administrations, 
as in Haiti and South Sudan. 
• Operating environment risk: The categories 
listed above may need to be supplemented 
with political economy analysis (important in 
Haiti), the role of religious institutions (a 
factor in Aceh), an assessment of ethnic 
and tribal conflict (a key issue in South 
Sudan), or other context-specific 
dimensions of the operating environment. 
• Implementing agencies risk: This is a critical 
area for FCAS and a complicated one as 
there are likely to be contradictory 
mitigating measures. To build capacity, the 
speed with which support is provided can 
be important. However, moving quickly may 
not be possible for risk-averse development 
partners that can be more concerned with 
controlling the risks of corrupt practices. 
These contradictory factors were addressed 
in the multidonor funds in Aceh, Haiti, and 
South Sudan by introducing rapid 
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procedures while simultaneously applying 
the policies and procedures of international 
agencies in keys areas such as financial 
management and procurement. 
• Project risks: At the level of individual 
investments, the international community 
can apply special procedures for 
postdisaster and FCAS settings. For 
example, the World Bank has special 
policies for development cooperation and 
conflict as well as for rapid response to 
crises and emergencies that allow for 
flexibility in areas like procurement 
thresholds, environmental and social 
safeguards, fiduciary requirements, 
retroactive financing, and third-party 
implementation. This flexibility was 
introduced in both Aceh and Haiti, and is 
anticipated for South Sudan. 
Realignment may also be necessary in the process 
of preparing the risk assessment, especially because 
of issues around the availability and quality of 
information. Ideally, the ORAF should be prepared 
quickly using secondary data. However, in fragile 
states, critical data may be missing, necessitating an 
investment in primary collection and analysis. For 
example, land tenure data in Aceh were lost after the 
tsunami so a community land readjudication program 
had to be implemented in order to facilitate 
reconstruction. This implies that completion of the 
ORAF in a fragile context may be more costly and 
time consuming than in a “normal” setting. 
3.3. Considerations for Implementing the Framework 
The World Bank’s Development Committee has 
identified six areas that are critical for 
operationalizing the findings of the 2011 World 
Development Report on conflict (World Bank, 2011b). 
These are also relevant considerations for applying 
the ORAF in fragile and conflict-affected situations. 
They are: 
1. Making country strategies more fragility-
focused: An ORAF can be an important input 
to guide the preparation of country 
partnership strategies by providing needed 
information on FCAS-specific risks as well as 
mitigation measures. 
2. Strengthening partnerships on development, 
security and justice: The ORAF should 
generate information not only for 
development activities but also concerning 
the linkages between development and 
security as well as development and justice 
reform. 
3. Increasing attention to jobs and private 
sector development: Here, the ORAF will 
need to consider labor-intensive employment 
opportunities, “quick win” public- and 
community-based job creation and private 
sector tools, such as microfinance, solutions 
for small- and medium-sized enterprises, 
and special economic zones. 
4. Realigning results and risk management 
frameworks (see previous section) 
5. Seeking less volatility in financing: the ORAF 
can be especially useful in this area by 
identifying modalities for delivering 
development assistance to mitigate the risks 
of deteriorating governance. 
6. Striving for global excellence in fragile and 
conflict-affected states: International 
development partners could improve the 
quality of their engagement in FCAS by 
institutionalizing the use of the ORAF and by 
collaborating in its preparation. 
The next consideration is the need to use 
assessment tools that can help address the 
knowledge gaps that were referenced in the previous 
section. The Asian Development Bank suggests that 
these include: political economy analysis; postcrisis 
needs assessment; public sector capacity 
development assessment; private sector 
assessment; social assessment focusing on the 
poorest, displaced, marginalized, and vulnerable 
peoples; conflict and disaster risk assessment; and 
climate risk assessment (ADB, 2012). 
A final consideration is that one should not entirely 
focus on risks and corresponding mitigation 
measures. Postdisaster reconstruction can be an 
opportunity to “build back better” by improving on 
predisaster conditions while also building resilience 
to future calamities (Fan, 2013). This was largely 
realized in Aceh but only partially achieved in Haiti. 
Similarly, one can pursue specific opportunities for 
progress on postconflict settings, for example, 
working with champions of reform and seeking to 
develop economic capital for development and 
capacity building, for example, oil revenues in South 
Sudan. Thus, one would want to accompany the 
ORAF with an analysis of opportunities using a tool 
such as the SWOT (strengths-weaknesses-
opportunities-threats) assessment. 
4. CONCLUSION 
The end of 2015 has been established as the 
deadline for achieving the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs). However, the majority of MDG 
targets will not be met by that time in fragile states. 
However, according to the latest analysis, there are 
some signs of progress: 20 fragile and conflict-
affected states have now met one or more MDG 
targets and another six are on track to do so by the 
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2015 deadline. Importantly, 20% of fragile states 
have now met the target to cut extreme poverty in 
half ahead of 2015 (World Bank, 2013d). It is hoped 
that increased use of the ORAF approach can 
improve the quality and impact of development 
assistance for reconstruction and development in 
FCAS and, thus, help to reinforce this positive trend. 












Afghanistan 2.9 Pb, Pk 




Chad 2.9  
Comoros 2.6  
DRC 3.0 Pk 
Congo, Rep 3.2  
Cote d’Ivoire 3.1 Pk 
Eritrea 2.0  
Guinea-Bissau 2.7 Pb 
Haiti 2.9 Pk 
Kiribati 2.9  
Kosovo 3.5 Pk 
Liberia 3.4 Pk 
Madagascar 3.1  
Malawi 3.2  
Mali 3.7 Pk 
Marshall Islands 2.7  
Micronesia, FS 2.7  
Myanmar -  
Nepal 3.7  
Sierra Leone 3.3 Pb 
Solomon Islands 3.2 Pb 
Somalia 1.2  
South Sudan 2.2 Pb 
Sudan 2.5 Pk 
Timor-Leste 3.2 Pk 
Togo 3.1 Pk 
Tuvalu 2.9  
Yemen 3.0  
Territories 





Zimbabwe 2.2  
Middle Income 
Iraq - Pb 
Libya - Pb 
Syria - Pb 
Source: World Bank (2013) 
 
 
                                                            
1 Fragile situations have either: (a) harmonized average 
Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) rating 
of 3.2 or less or (b) the presence of a UN and/or regional 
peace-keeping or peace-building mission during the past 
3 years. 
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